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"A text's unity  lies not  in its origin  but  in its destination." 
Roland  Barthes  (1977) 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper  I address  a question  rarely  asked by economists, 
policy  makers  or philosophers  of science:  how are  the policy 
conclusions  of international  economics  legitimated?  There  is a 
widespread  belief  that economic  policy  prescriptions,  perhaps 
especially  in international  economics,  are of grave  importance  for 
individual  and national  well-being.  The positive  theory  of trade 
(what determines  the commodity  composition  and direction  of  trade), 
from  its inception,  has always  been  closely  tied  to the question  of 
welfare  (what are  the gains  from  trade);  indeed,  the rationale  for 
liberalized  Anglo-Portuguese  trade  in Ricardo's  famous  example  was 
that  such  trade would  bring  benefit  to both  trading  partners. 
International  economists  have  thus always  been  under  pressure  from 
other  economists  and policy  makers  to establish  the policy  relevance 
of their work.  More  than  in any other branch  of economics,  the 
laissez-faire  view  in international  economics  ("free trade")  is 
recognized  as a policy  choice.  Thus  theory  and policy  are closely 
linked  and  the policy  conclusions,  especially  the free  trade  version, 
have  received  considerable  public  attention  since Ricardo  first  stated 
his views. 
Given  this  tradition  of concern  with policy  and the policy 
relevance  of international  economics,  it is surprising  how  little 
discussion  has  focused  on the scientific  or epistemological  status  of 
such policy  conclusions.  Economists  and philosophers  of science  spend 
much  time debating  the status  of truth claims  generated  from  theory  in the social  sciences, 
policy  prescriptions 
yet  little  thought  is given  to the status  of 
that  i'follow"  from the theory.  Generally  such 
2 
policy  conclusions  are  seen  to follow  "straightforwardly"  from 
theoretical  insights.  The move  from theory  to policy  conclusion  is 
perceived  as completely  natural  and thus rarely  receives  any scrutiny. 
This  paper  is a first  step  in the analysis  of how  theoretical  Or 
empirical  knowledge  is used  to validate  and support  policy 
conclusions.  McCloskey  (1991) describes  the academic  journal  article 
as a "sandwich"  in which  the introduction  and policy  conclusions  are 
"the bread"  lying on either  side of "the meat"  of  the article.  In 
this paper,  to carry  the metaphor  one step further,  I look at what 
holds  the sandwich  together.  The focus  is on the rhetorical  practices 
-- that  is the types of arguments  -- used  to link  theory  to policy 
prescription  in international  economics. 
A survey  of the major  U.S. academic  journals  in the field  of 
international  trade over  the period  1988-1992  reveals  a wide  variety 
of such  validating  practices.  There  is a looseness  of language  and 
argument  in the linking  of  theory  to policy  prescription  which  is in 
stark  contrast  with  the rigidity  of discourse  in conventional  of 
economic  analysis.  This  contrast  implies  that  the discourse  of 
mathematical  theory and  econometrics  is "unstable",  lacking  sufficient 
persuasive  power  in the legitimation  of international  economic  policy. 
Robert  Baldwin  puts  the distinction  in terms perhaps  more 
familiar  to economists.  He chides  trade economists  for  "using  a 
different  model  to reach policy  conclusions  from  the one  they employ 
in analyzing  most  trading  situations.  The first model  is much  less 
formal  than  the latter..."  (Baldwin, 1992, p.  827).  The purpose  of 
this Paper  is to analyze  in detail  the rhetoric  of the less formal  of 3 
these models  and  to show  that  this type of model  is not an accidental 
methodological  discrepancy,  but a necessary  modeling  strategy  for 
legitimating  policy  conclusions  generated  by  the more  formal  type of 
model.  I argue  that  this methodological  discrepancy  occurs  not 
because  policy  conclusions  matter  so little, but precisely  because 
they are  crucial  to the legitimation  of the field  itself. 
2.  The Rhetoric of Economics  and Contemporary  Trade Theory 
Two  recent  developments  in economics  render  unacceptable  the 
passive  acceptance  of  the theory/policy  links  in international  trade 
research.  The  first  is the methodological  upheaval  brought  on by 
McCloskey's  (1985) claim  that economics  is inevitably  rhetorical  -- 
rooted  in argument  and persuasion,  not any absolute  standard. 
Rhetorical  is not a perjorative  term, but embodies  the recognition 
that  facts  do not make  arguments;  the arguments  are critical.  Such 
arguments  entail  a variety  of strategies  and  techniques  including 
metaphor,  hierarchy  of discourse,  and appeals  to authority.' 
According  to McCloskey  (1990, p. 56): 
Economic  stories  depend  on rhetoric.  The point  is not  to expose 
the rhetoric  and  then condemn  it for being  rhetoric.  Rhetoric  is 
unavoidable.  An economist  or historian  cannot  avoid writing 
rhetorically  since  any argument  has a rhetoric,  a style  of 
argument,  taking  "argument"  to mean  "any designs  on the reader." 
A collection  of random  facts and assorted  bits  of logic  does not 
add up  to an argument;  but as soon as a writer  advocates  a model 
or a story  in which  the facts and logic are  to fit, he has begun 
to argue.  If one is to argue  in favor of this or that  story 
'  See Milberg  (1988) for a detailed  treatment  of these elements  in 
the context  of neoclassical  trade  theory. there  is no way  of being  non-rhetorical. 
This  anti-modernist  portrayal  of economics,  inspired  by  the 
philosophical  work  of Rorty  and Habermas,  has  encouraged  some 
economists  to scrutinize  the language  (including mathematics  and 
econometrics)  used  in economic  argument  to better  understand  how 
economic  "scienceN'  functions.2  The  link between  theoretical  or 
empirical  analysis  and policy  conclusions  is an obvious  candidate  for 
examination  along  these  lines.  The bread  of the economic  sandwich 
often  reveals  more  than the "meat"  (e.g. the theoretical  model  or 
econometric  test)  since  the latter  is closely  scrutinized.3 
The  second  development  lies within  international  economics 
itself.  The  sterility  and narrowness  of the basic  neoclassical  model 
of international  trade,  the Heckscher-Ohlin  or factor  endowments 
model,  came  under  increasing  scrutiny  in the 1970's.  Most  important, 
neoclassical  economists  began  to question  the usefulness  of this 
standard  model.  The  inability  of factor  endowments  to explain  a 
number  of widely  observed  phenomena  put  the framework  of the model 
itself  under  attack  by policy  makers  and business  experts  and  then by 
mainstream  economists.  These  phenomena  were  (1) intra-industry  trade, 
that is the abundance  of instances  of simultaneous  export  and  import 
by a country  of similar  goods  (e.g. France's  simultaneous  exporting 
and  importing  of automobiles);  and  (2) the apparent  success  of 
selective  protection,  subsidies  and  industrial  policy,  especially  in 
2  There  is now  a vast  literature  of interpretation  of  economics 
texts  as  well  as  a  debate  over  the  methodological  implications  and 
importance  of  McCloskey's  "rhetoric  of  economics".  Two  excellent 
collections  of  articles  are  Samuels  (1990) and  Klamer,  McCloskey  and 
Solow  (1988). 
3 Mayer's  (1993) "principle of the strongest link" illustrates  this 
point.  See also McCloskey  (1990, p. 73) 5 
the cases  of Japan  and South  Korea. 
The  response  to this explanatory  failure  led to the development 
of  "the new  international  economics,"  beginning  in the late  1970's. 
This new  approach  stresses  economies  of scale,  imperfect  competition, 
and  strategic  interaction  among  rival  firms and governments,  and has 
increasingly  provided  a rational  basis  for phenomena  previously 
unexplained  by neoclassical  thought.4  While  solving  some  important 
problems,  the new  international  economics  has created  dilemmas  of its 
0WI-l.  In particular,  by devising  theoretical  models  in which  selective 
trade protection  (so-called  "strategic  trade policy")  is welfare- 
enhancing  for a nation  under  certain  conditions,  the new  international 
economists  are faced with  the necessity  of prescribing  policies  which 
run counter  to the long-standing  free  trade position  of international 
economists.  But  instead  of defying  the neoclassical  tradition,  many 
of these  economists  have backed  away  from the logical  conclusions  of 
their models.  Robert  Lucas  (19901, hardly  a critic  of neoclassical 
economics,  remarks  at length  about  this contradictory  voice  in his 
review  of Elhanan  Helpman  and  Paul Krugman's  (1989) Trade  Policy  and 
Market  Structure.  Lucas  states: 
Throughout  Trade  Policy  and Market  Structure,  Helpman  and 
Krugman  exhibit what  strikes  a reader  as extreme  discomfort  with 
the policy  implications  of the new  trade theory.  At one point 
they  even protest  that  "this book  is about  theory  and methods, 
and not  about policy,"  (p.8) as though  someone  else had  chosen 
the title  of the book!  The clearest  statement  of the source  of 
the discomfort  comes  in the concluding  chapter:  "Is the case  for 
4 See Krugman  (1983) for a concise explanation of the break from the 
traditional  model.  See  Krugman  (1986,  1987)  for  non-technical 
expressions  of the implications  of the new international  economics. 6 
free  trade,  so  long a central  tenet, now  invalidated?  Despite 
what  we have  said about  the effects  of trade policy  we  do not 
think  so"  (p. 185)  .  .  .Helpman  and Krugam  seem not  so much  to be 
defending  the validity  of what  they are calling  the  "central 
economic  tenet"  of free trade as trying  to avoid  the blame  for 
being  the first  to expose  its emptiness! 
One  can  sympathize  with  this discomfort...1  take disclaimers 
such as  "strategic  trade policy  arguments  have  already  appeared 
in support  of views  none  of the concept's  originators  hold"  (p.8) 
as attempts  by  the authors  to avoid  such responsibility.  This  is 
certainly  a defensible  personal  stance, but what  does  it have  to 
do with  economic  theory?.5 
Lucas  is thus critical  of the "two separate  models"  of economic 
analysis  identified  by Baldwin  (19921, one a highly  sophisticated 
model  of the economy  and  the other a highly  simplified  model  of the 
state.  The  latter  is invoked  in the formulation  of policy 
conclusions.  A related  tendency  is to scrutinize  relatively  more 
carefully  those policy  conclusions  which  conflict  with  the laissez- 
faire view,  to the point  where  completely  new criteria  are  established 
for  the legitimation  of policy  conclusions.6  The result  is to place 
in the spotlight  the rhetoric  of  -- that is, the argumentative  basis 
for  -- the link between  theory and policy  conclusions. 
5 In his own defense, Krugman  (19921, has stated first, that "It was 
onlv as a sort of afterthouqht  that new  trade theorists  begant  to talk 
abo;t policy  implications," -(1992,  p. 428) 
"the gains from deviating  from free trade, 
(1992, p.  435) 
5  See,  for  example,  Dixit  (1986, 
comments  on this phenomenon  generally  in 
and second, that empirically, 
furthermore,  are very smail." 
Pa  283).  Heilbroner  (1988) 
economic  thought. 7 
3.  A Taxonomy  of the Rhetoric  of Theory-Policy  Links 
The  leap from  theory  to policy  is taken,  of course,  only  if it is 
believed  that theory  is llrelevant" -- that is, necessary  to guide  the 
making  of actual  economic  policy.  Many  articles  in academic  journals, 
both  theoretical  and  empirical,  never make  such a claim  and  in fact 
are  concerned  strictly  with  non-policy  related  issues,  such as the 
effect  of exchange  rate variations  on prices  or the importance  Of 
international  trade  in international  productivity  convergence.  I am 
interested,  therefore,  only  in those articles  with  explicit  policy 
relevance.  There,  I have  identified  five  types of arguments  for 
policy  relevance  in international  economics: 
I. "No  Frills -  Theory":  Under  this practice  the policy 
conclusions  follow  directly  from the logic of the theoretical  model 
and do not go beyond  this.  No attempt  is made  to argue  for the 
relevance  of the theoretical  model  as a guide  for policy  conclusions 
or to establish  the presence  of the ceteris  oaribus  conditions  needed 
to secure  its intended  outcome.  Instead,  these conclusions  involve 
the simple  reporting  of mathematical  results  (for example,  comparative 
static  results  involving  the effects  of a change  in the exogenous 
tariff  variable).  Mai  and Hwang  (1989) present  their model  results  in 
a table  and state: 
.  . . all  the established  results  on the price  effects  of  tariffs, 
ratio  quotas  and volume  quotas  can be summarized  in table  1.  Our 
results  indicate  that,  in general  the three alternative  trade 
restrictions  result  in non-equivalence,  as it depends  upon  the 
behavior  patterns  of firms  in the industries.  (p. 182) 
In similar  fashion,  Lapan  (1988) states: 
We have  shown  that if production  lags are present  and  tariff 8 
precommitment  is not  feasible,  then  the time-consistent  tariff 
equilibrium  is Pareto  inferior  to the precommitment  equilibrium, 
and  the second-best  solution  will  include  a production  tax on 
importables. 
Less modest,  but  equally  true to the model,  Grossman  and Helpman 
(1990) state: 
Concerning  policy,  we  find  for the first  time a link between 
trade  intervention  and  long-run  growth.  any  (small) trade policy 
that  switches  spending  toward  the consumer  good produced  by  the 
country  with  comparative  advantage  in R&D will  cause  long-run 
growth  rates  to decline...  Once  we recognize  that comparative 
advantage  can be acquired  as well  as natural,  we  find  a role  for 
country  size and demand-size  bias  in determining  the  long-run 
effects  of policy. 
Behind  what  I have called  the No Frills  - Theory mechanism  is a 
reliance  on Pareto  optimality  derived  from axiomatic,  choice-theoretic 
models.  It is on this premise  that international  economists  can claim 
a "rational  basis"  for economic  policy,  since  there  is no  truth  or 
relevance  claim  beyond  the logic of the rational  choice  model.  In 
this view,  the purpose  of economics  is simply  to state  the 
"implications"  of neoclassical  theory, with  the implicit  assumption 
that  the setting  of the "real world"  will  not affect  these 
implications. 
II.  "No Frills  -  Empirics":  Under  this practice  the policy 
conclusions  follow  from  the logic of a theoretical  model  and are 
bolstered  or weakened  by an empirical  test of the model.  This  is the 
classic  sophisticated  positivist  methodology,  derived  from  Popper's 
"conjectures  and refutations".  The author  generates  a refutable 9 
hypothesis  and  then puts  this hypothesis  to empirical  test.  Markusen 
and Wigle  (19891,  for example,  base  their policy  conclusions  on a 
theoretical  model  and a simulation  of a computable  general  equilibrium 
model  calibrated  to actual  data  for the U.S.  and Canada,  showing  that 
the optimal  tariff  for  the U.S.  is greater  than that for Canada.  Khan 
and  Knight  (1988) develop  a theoretical  model  which  reveals  how  import 
compression  can reduce  export growth  and foreign  exchange  earnings. 
They  then  test  the model  using  regressions  and  simulation.  Note  that 
most  empirical  studies  of policy  relevance  follow  an approach  Of 
simple  empirics,  described  below. 
III.  HC!asual  Empirics":  Under  this practice,  policy  conclusions 
follow  from  the logic  of the theoretical  model  plus  an assertion  of 
the relevance  of the results  based  on  (a) their compatibility  with 
some casually  observed  phenomenon  or  (b) the addition  of a stylized 
fact  or facts.  Bagwell  and Staiger  (1990), for example,  move  directly 
from  their  theoretical  conclusions  that  "periods  of unusually  high 
trade volume  present  countries  with unusually  strong  incentive  to 
defect  from cooperative  trading  arrangements"  to the claim  for 
relevance  that: 
The  'safeguards'  provisions  of the GATT, whereby  countries  are 
given  the right  to raise protection  in the event  of unforeseen 
developments,  may  to some extent  reoresent  an explicit 
institutional  manifestation  of our ideas.  (emphasis added) 
This  is a "cart before  the horse"  type argument  for policy  relevance: 
it is casually  observed  that governments  (or individual  agents) 
undertake  a  certain  type  of  action  and  deem  it welfare-enhancing. 
Thus  a theoretical  model  which  supports  such a policy  has policy 
relevance. 10 
The preceding  quotation  is followed  in the text by a footnote  in 
which  the authors  add additional  support  for their claim  by quoting  a 
1970  institutional  study of GATT.  The authors  then restate  their 
policy  conclusion  and  implicitly  invoke  its empirical  relevance  in 
order  to further  legitimate  the  (casually ,observed) Policy 
conclusions: 
Our  analysis  suggests  a role  for safeguard  provisions  when  trade 
volume  is unexpectedly  high  as a means  of avoiding  a reversion  to 
noncooperative  interaction  among  countries.  In this  light,  the 
recent  proliferation  of safeguard  "substitutes,li for  example  VERs 
and OMAs,  may  reflect  the general  inadequacy  of the existing 
safeguards  provisions  to maintain  the credibility  of the rest  of 
the GATT  system.  (emphasis added) 
Gardner  and Kimbrough  (19891, in a purely  theoretical  article, 
summarize  their results: 
More  specifically,  it has been  shown  that in contrast  to 
conventional  wisdom,  both permanent  and  temporary  tariffs  may 
worsen  the trade balance.  For instance,  in an example 
characterized  by  identical  and homothetic  tastes,  it was 
demonstrated  that a temporary  tariff may worsen  the trade balance 
if the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  is 
low enough  (6 < 1) and  the tariff-imposing  country  is running  a 
deficit. 
With  the use  of stylized  facts and broad  characterizations  of 
behavioral  processes,  they move, without  transition,  to a discussion 
of  "policymakersUU, who: 
persuaded  by  the conventional  wisdom,  are inclined  to use  tariffs 
in times of trade balance  difficulties  in an attempt  to improve 11 
matters...  [Bloth 
trade balance  and 
permanent  and temporary  tariffs may worsen  the 
policy  makers  should be aware  of this 
possibility...[P]  olicv  makers  need  to realize  that while  once 
enacted  a tariff may  improve  the trade balance,  lengthy  debates 
that  lead consumers  to anticipate  the tariff will  cause  the trade 
balance  to deteriorate  prior  to its enactment.  (emphasis  added) 
Andersen  (1992) leaps from a theoretical  model  to a discussion  Of 
U.S.  anti-dumping  law.  He asserts  without  argument  that  the model 
"may be useful  for designing  codes  for trade policy,  such as  the 
Uruguay  Round  attempt  to design  anti-dumping  codes."  Note  that  such 
leaps are also possible  (but much  less common)  from  largely  empirical 
studies.  Morrison  (1988), for example,  describes  her  regression 
results  as  "provocative",  allowing  her  to extrapolate  as follows:  "If 
Japan  is more  flexible  this could have been  an important  advantage 
during  the volatile  197Os,  contributing  to its relatively  strong 
productivity  growth  and other  economic  performance."  Staiger  et al. 
(1988)  appeal  explicitly  to "casual  empiricism." 
The  language  of Casual  Empirics  is such that it may be difficult 
to determine  if it is the model  or the observed  world  that is being 
discussed.  Gruenspecht  (1988), for example,  admits  the "practical" 
difficulties  in operationalizing  his model  and  then asserts: 
These  difficulties  should not obscure  the message  that  the 
availability  of a current  cost antidumping  standard  changes  the 
behavior  of both  domestic  and foreign  firms  in internationally 
competitive  industries  where  learning  is important.  This  impact 
is likely  to be pernicious  from both  a national  and world  welfare 
Pespective  where  the markets  under  consideration  are roughly 
'parallel'  in terms of market  size, production  cost  and 12 
concentration. 
The  implication  is that  this is a practical,  policy  relevant,  claim. 
The move  from  theoretical  result  to actual  policy  relevance  is almost 
invisible. 
Casual  Empirics  also  includes  the illusionism  of language,  in 
which  care  is taken  to phrase  the theoretical  model  in terms  of 
realistic  categories,  such as the use of  MNorth-South"  in some models 
of trade  and development.  Illusionism  serves  to establish  the theory 
as an allegory  and  lends  itself  to comparison  with  actual  institutions 
and policy  situations.7 
Note  that  this practice  comes close,  but  is not,  a justification 
of policy  conclusions  based  on explicit  argument  for  the realism  of 
the assumptions  of the model.  Instead,  the legitimation  of  the policy 
conciusions  is based  on the "illusionism"  of the language  described 
above  or the argument  that the results  seem  to have 
casually  observed  situation. 
IV.  lgModestyvw:  Under  this practice  the policy 
relevance  for  the 
conclusions  follow 
from  the logic of the model,  plus  an assertion  of relevance  based 
(a) the admission  of the narrowness  of the model's  assumptions  or 
a warning  of the likelihood  of government  abuse  if the prescribed 
on 
(b) 
policy  is implemented.  Case  (a) is in effect  a perversion  of Casual 
Empirics.  The  argument  for  policy  relevance  takes  the form  of a 
self-serving  modesty,  in which  the author  admits  the narrowness  of the 
model  and at the same  time asserts  its l'real-world" relevance.  This 
tactic  is a trademark  of policy  relevance  arguments  in the new 
international  economics.  For example,  Matsuyama  (19901, admits  that 
7  For  an  analysis  of  illusionism  and  how  it works  in  an  early 
article  in the new  international  economics,  see Milberg  (1988). 13 
"there are many  aspects  of reality  ignored  in the model."  Cheng 
(1988) qualifies  his results  because  the assumption  of linear  demand 
"is a special  case"  . . .  and because  of  "the abundance  of equilibria 
from  different  oligopoly  strategies."  This  admission  of narrowness  is 
used  to assert  the legitimacy  of the theoretical  result. 
Case  (b) involves  a denial  of the usefulness  of the policy 
conclusions  because  of potential  misuse  of such knowledge  by  the 
state,  presumably  because  the state  is dominated  by  special  interest 
groups.  The  case  invokes  the caveat  that the results  "can be misused 
in practice."  (Panagariya,  1992).*  Often, Modesty cases  (a) and  (b) 
are used  in tandem.  Clemenz  (1990) states his  theoretical  results 
that free  trade may not be optimal  for attaining  desired  R&D  levels 
and  then asserts  that  "this conclusion  has  to be  treated with  care," 
because  the model  is partial  equilibrium  (case  (a)) and because 
"problems  specific  to various  policy  measures...have  not been 
accounted  for." This  is an example  of case  (b).  In particular, 
"Subsidies  create  problems  of their own" and  "there may be cheaper 
ways  of doing  thisI'  than protection.'  Matsuyama  (1990) also uses  a 
combination  of cases  (a) and  (b) of the Modesty  practice.  In his 
concluding  remarks  he first  summarizes  the theoretical  result,  a game- 
theoretic  model  in which: 
rather  surprisingly,  optimal  temporary  protection  can be 
supported  by a subgame-perfect  equilibrium...  In this 
8  Krugman  (1992, p.  429) describes  his  UUmodel"  of GATT  behavior 
("GATT-think")  as  'Ia simple  set  of  principles  that  is  entirely 
consistent,  explains most  of what goes on in negotiations,  but makes  no 
sense  in terms of economics." 
9  It is of note  that when  free trade yields  optimality  in theory, 
there is never discussion  of treating the results  "with care."  See Dixit 
(1986). 14 
equilibrium,  the government's  payoff  is smaller  than  the first 
best  outcome,  due to its inability  to make  a credible  commitment. 
He  then begins  a list of caveats,  admitting  the model's  narrow 
treatment  of the state: 
However,  I do not mean  to say that  the government  cannot  make  a 
credible  commitment  to the future  liberalization  in reality. 
There  are several  possibilities  which  the liberalization  qame 
fails  to take into account.  First,  the qovernment  miqht  be aware 
of  "the demonstartion  effect"  of liberalization...  Second,  the 
qovernments  miqht  be  able  to sign a contract  with  a third party 
(perhaps,  the GATT)  . .  .  Third,  the domestic  government  miqht  want 
to ask a foreign  government  to exert diplomatic  p  ressure  to  - 
liberalize  the domestic  market  (as some observers  suspect  that 
Japanese  Ministry  of International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI) has 
done with  the United  States...  Perhaps  the most  problematic 
feature  of the model  is its treatment  of the domestic  government 
as a unified,  coherent  body of decision  makers.  In realitv,  any 
economic  policy  is a product  of complex  interactions  among 
different  parts  of the government,  each of which  has  its own 
objectives.  (emphasis added) 
Note  that  the admission  of the model's  limitations  involves  the use  of 
a casual  empiricism  reminiscent  of practice  III.  Modesty  is similar 
to Casual  Empirics  in that  the conception  of the state  invoked  is a 
stylized  fact, never  developed  (theoretically  or empirically)  in the 
article.  Illusionism  of language  is also common  under  the Modesty 
practice. 
V.  "Empirics  Only":  Under  this practice  the policy  conclusions 
follow  from an empirical  test of a model  with  little  theoretical 15 
content.  Important  here  is that the policy  conclusion  has no explicit 
root  in a rational-choice  framework.  Empirics  Only is often  used  in 
cases  where  the theoretical  hypothesis  is already  well  established  in 
the literature.  Noland  (1989), for example,  verbally  states  the 
argument  for the J-curve  effect  and then moves  quickly  to the 
econometrics.  He concludes  with  a simple  reporting  of the regression 
estimates  and  the following  policy  conclusion: 
The  estimates  reported  in this paper  indicate  that if 
policymakers  wish  to target  the trade balance,  policies  which 
affect  the level  of economic  activity  would  be more  effective 
than  those which  operate  through  the exchange  rate. 
Under  the Empirics  Only mechanism,  policy  relevance  depends  on the 
relation  to policy  of the empirical  test, and  is established  with  the 
simpie  reporting  of empirical  results.  Dinopoulos  and Kreinen  (1988), 
for  example,  conclude  their article  as follows: 
In 1982,  the total  social cost of the VER was put at $4 billions 
and  the VER  saved an estimates  22,358  jobs.  This works  out  to an 
annual  cost of $181,000  per job saved  - a multiple  of the average 
annual  compensation  of U.S. auto workers. 
Sometimes  Empirics  Only is used  for hypotheses  that do not have  a 
strong  microfoundation,  choice  theoretic  basis,  even  in the pure 
theory  literature.  On occasion  the hypotheses  tested  are developed 
using  simple  accounting  identities  or general  functional  forms,  and 
thus are  immediately  translated  to regression  models  (e.g. Audretsch 
and Yamawaki,  1988).  Often  they are simply  stated  as having  a 
tradition  in the literature  (e.g. Dinopoulos  and Kreinin,  1988).  That 
is,  the hypothesis  may be well-established  on optimization  grounds  or 
not.  The key  is that a verbal  rendition  of the hypothesis  is 16 
sufficient  to justify moving  on quickly  to empirical  testing. 
I have  also divided  those articles  which  have no direct  policy 
relevance  between  those containing  only  theoretical  content  (No Policy 
- Theory)  and  those using  empirical  analysis  as well  (No Policy  - 
Empirics) .  These  are entered  as rhetorica.  practices  VI  and VII  in 
the results  reported  below. 
4.  Survey  Results 
The  survey  included  four major  U.S. academic  journals  containing 
articles  on international  trade  -- The American  Economic  Review  (ml, 
The  Journal  of International  Economics  (JIE), The Journal  of Political 
Economy  (JPE), and The Review  of Economics  and Statistics  (RES) -- to 
determine  the incidence  of each of the rhetorical  practices  described 
ab0ve.l'  The  sample period  is 1988-1992,  and includes  all articles  on 
international  trade from  the four journals.ll  The  sample  size  is 180 
and  the full data set is available  from the author  on request. 
The  coding  was done by  examining  the body  of the article  to 
determine  (1) if it was  in the field of international  trade;  (2) if it 
had  explicit  or implicit  policy  implications;  (3) if it contained 
empirical  content  or not.  Finally,  the rhetorical  practice  used  in 
the legitimation  of the policy  implications,  usually  located  in the 
concluding  section,  was  identified. 
The  data  are presented  in summary  form  in Table  1.  Overall, 
lo I have chosen only neoclassical  journals  in order to leave aside 
the (separate) question of how ideology influences the rhetoric of policy 
relevance.  A  potentially  interesting  extension  would  be  to  survey 
articles  in non-mainstream  journals  (e.g. The Journal  of Post Keynesian 
Economics,  The  Review  of  Radical  Political  Economics,  The  Journal  of 
Economic  Issues) to compare  the incidence of rhetorical practices  across 
schools  of thought. 
11  Each journal  is quarterly.  I excluded  the proceedings  issue of 
the m,  since most papers  are short summaries  of research.  For 1992, 
only  the first  issue of each  journal was used. 17 
62.2%  of  the articles  sampled  contained  policy  conclusions  -- either 
explicit  policy  prescriptions  or direct policy  implications.  Of  the 
total  sample,  31.1%  contained  empirical  content  and 68.9% were 
entirely  theoretical.  A significantly  lower percentage  of articles 
containing  policy  conclusions  had empirical  content  compared  to those 
without  policy  conclusions.  Of articles  containing  no policy 
conclusions,  55.9%  included  empirical  studies.  Of articles  with 
policy  relevance,  only  16.1% had  empirical  content.  This  is precisely 
the opposite  of the expectation  that policy-relevant  research  will 
tend  to be grounded  on empirical  support,  and  that when  such relevance 
is not  at stake,  empirical  support will be  less  important.  According 
to the survey,  empirical  analysis  is often used  to explore  positive 
issues,  whereas  policy-related  issues are most  often  analyzed  using 
purely  theoretical  arguments.12 
Of all articles  claiming  policy  relevance,  42.0% used  No Fril.ls-- 
Theory  to legitimate  the conclusions  and 32.1% used  Casual  Empirics, 
ranking  as the two most  popular  rhetorical  mechanisms  used  to 
legitimate  policy  results.  No Frills--Theory  represents  the least 
12  This  is apparently  not unique  to international  trade  research. 
Discussing  macroeconomics,  Lucas  (1980) described  the role of theory as 
the "provision of fully articulated,  artificial economic systems that can 
serve  as  laboratories  in  which  policies  that  would  be  prohibitively 
expensive  to experiment  with  in actual  economies  can be  tested  out  at 
much  lower cost."  Note  that this result should  send a warning  to those 
calling  for  more  "policy-oriented"  training  in  graduate  economics 
education  as  a  way  of  introducing  more  realism  and  "real  world" 
applications  (JEL, 1991).  The implications  of the survey presented  here 
are  that  greater  emphasis  on policy  would,  ceteris  paribus,  raise  the 
percentage  of  graduate  training  devoted  to  theory.  Morgan  (1988) 
presents  some evidence  that empirical  analysis  may be gaining  favor  in 
the major  academic  journals.  Learner  (1991, p. 216) argues that the lack 
of influence  of empirical  research  in international  economics  is due, in 
part,  to the low quality of the empirical work.  He notes that "There are 
many examples of work in international  economics in which the translation 
of  theory  into  an  empirical  exercise  was  casual  and  'intuitive,'  and 
which  were  later discovered  to have been  fatally  flawed." 18 19 
complex  link  of theory  and policy;  however,  this  should  not be takento 
mean most  "scientific."  Regardless  of the rhetorical  practice  chosen, 
each represents  an effort  to most  persuasively  and credibly  present 
the policy  implications  of the analysis."  In this  sense, No Frills-- 
Theory  should  be evaluated  for what  it does not  include  as well  as 
what  it includes.  For example,  it entails neither  discussion  of the 
realism  of assumptions  nor any argument  for the applicability  of the 
analysis  to a situation  of actual  policy  making.  In short,  the value 
of the policy  conclusions,  and more  generally  of  the knowledge 
generated  in such articles  is based  on the reader's  acceptance  of the 
"economyI'  depicted  in the model.  As Summers  (1991, pp.  144-45) 
states: 
I suspect  that there  is a meta-theorem  that any policy 
recommendation  can be derived  from some model  of optimizing 
behavior... If  empirical  testing  is ruled  out,  and persuasion  is 
not  attempted,  in the end I am not  sure these  theoretical 
exercises  teach us anything  at all about  the world  we  live in. 
Mechanisms  I and II do less than  the other mechanisms  in quelling  such 
skepticism. 
The new  international  economics  in its early  days  relied  heavily 
on Modesty.14  Increasingly,  modelers  of trade under  various  oligopoly 
conditions  have  turned  to No Frills  -  Theory  to articulate  policy 
conclusions.  This  is consistent  with  an apparent  admission  on the 
part  of new  international  economics  economists  that  their aim  is no 
longer  to speak  to policy  makers  but  to provide  other  economists  with 
13  McCloskey  (1990, p.  56) writes,  "'Just  give  me  the  facts'  is 
itself a rhetoric,  Sergeant  Friday urging his case by claiming  not to." 
14  See Krugman  (1986). an ex oost  rational  basis  for existing  policy.  In this  sense  the 
international  economics  is a retreat  on the part  of international 
20 
new 
economists.  The  IIold"  international  economics  proclaimed,  "If the 
world  satisfies  these assumptions,  then the following  will  result  and 
such-and-such  policy  will be optimal."  The new  international 
economics,  on  the other  hand,  says  "we see the following  phenomena  in 
the world.  If we  then specify  the model  in this particular  way,  we 
can  explain  it in terms of individual  agents'  rationality."  The  aim 
of the new  international  economics  is thus proof  that a given  result 
can be derived  from a model  of rational  choice.  But  this aim can be 
of interest  only  to those who need  a rational-choice-theoretic 
justification,  which  is not  likely  to include policy  makers.14  The 
result  is that new  international  economics  economists  are  increasingly 
encouraged  to retreat  into highly  stylized  models,  with  very 
particular  functional  forms or assumptions  on conjectural 
variations.15 
Most  surprising  is the almost  nonexistent  use  of No Frills - 
14  Rhetorical  practice  I  (No Frills -  Theory)  may  include  cases 
where the realism of the model's assumptions  is defended.  In this event, 
the  author  might  not  feel  obligated  to  restate  such  a  defense  when 
stating  his policy  conclusions.  The new  international  economics  shows 
an ambivalence  towards  the realism of assumptions.  On the one hand,  the 
models  are  said  to  contain  more  realism  than  the  old  international 
economics.  On the other hand, the  (interventionist)  policy  conclusions 
which logically follow from these models are discounted because  they lack 
the generality  of more  conventional 
tension  in  the  rhetorical  approach 
insist  that  the question  of realism 
(1988). 
:5  Thus  the new  international 
models.  Note  that there  is also a 
to  economics  itself,  which  would 
is impossible  to gauge.  See Maki 
economics  represents  a degenerate 
research  program  in the sense of Lakatos.  According  to Diesing  (1991, 
p. 461,  II..  .degenerating  research  programs  do not predict  new  facts or 
produce  new  theories,  but  concentrate  on  adjusting  their  theories  to 
events after  they have happened."  Bensel and Elmslie  (19921, it should 
be noted,  come  to a different  conclusion,  arguing  that most  of the new 
international  economics  is neither  degernerative  nor progressive. 21 
Empirics.  Empirical  work,  most  common  in m,  was  rarely  preceeded  by 
substantial  theoretical  argument  and was  thus characterized  as 
Empirics  Only.  But  the No Frills  -  Empirics  approach  represents  the 
classic  Popperian  conjecture  and refutation  methodology:  Develop  a 
new  theoretical  hyopothesis  and  test it empirically.  The  fact  that 
this methodology  is so seldom used  indicates  that one must  put 
stereotypes  aside  to understand  how policy  relevance  is established  in 
contemporary  research-l6 
The high  incidence  of Casual  Empirics  as a rhetorical  device  is 
best  understood  by considering  how economics  argument  persuades. 
While  the analysis  itself must  follow very  strict  logical  rules,  the 
analytical  framework,  because  of its narrowness,  may preclude 
convincing  links  to institutions,  policies  and histories.  Casual 
Empirics  then  serves  to bring  in a realism  which  is not permitted  in 
the analysis  proper.  The  looseness  which  characterizes  the approach 
of Casual  Empirics  offsets  the rigidity  of theoretical  modelling 
conventions  and  thereby  allays  any discomfort  with  the 
unpersuasiveness  of the model  results  in themselves.  Such a technique 
is not unique  to international  trade research,  as evidenced  by 
Summers's  (1991)  comment  on  "successful"  (i.e. influential)  empiricai 
macroeconomic  research: 
First  and  foremost,  in each case,  the bottom  line was  a stylized 
fact  or collection  of stylized  facts  characterizing  an aspect  of 
how  the world  worked  rather  than parameter  estimates  or formal 
tests  of a point  hypothesis.. .The conclusion  could  prove  to be 
I5 This divergence between what economists  say they do and what  they 
actually  do is discussed  below.  Extending  our survey back  in time wouid 
be  useful  to guage  if such  a method  was  ever  common  in  international 
trade research. 22 
persuasive  or unpersuasive,  but  the reader was not  in doubt  that 
there was  one.(p.  140) 
Somewhat  surprising 
rhetorical  stance,  since 
international  economics. 
in the early  and mid  1980's.  By the late  1980's,  the new 
is the low incidence  of Modesty  as a 
this was previously  the trademark  of 
Most  likely,  such a stance was more 
the new 
common 
international  economics  results  are  presented  for the purpose  of 
policy  implications  in a number  of other  forms,  especially  using  the 
two No Frills  approaches. 
The  results  by journal  are presented  in Tables  2  and  3. 
Consistent  with  the aggregate  results,  the empirical  journal  RES  has a 
much  lower percentage  of articles  with  policy  conclusions  than does 
the largely  theoretical  journal JIE.  But  the table also yields  some 
surprising  insights.  The JIE had a much  higher  percentage  of articles 
with  policy  conclusions  than any of the other  journal  surveyed. 
Moreover,  of the articles  claiming  policy  relevance,  the JIE  had  a 
much  higher  incidence  of the No Frills -  Theory  approach  compared  to 
the other  journals.  55.4%  of policy  relevant  articles  in the JIE  used 
this practice  to legitimate  policy  conclusions  compared  to only  31.3% 
for  the &EJ.  That  is, the AER  contained  a much  higher  incidence  of 
the Casual  Empirics,  Modesty  and Empirics  Only practices.  In other 
words,  while  a smaller  share of AER articles  are of policy  relevance 
compared  to the JIE, AER  articles  are more  likely  to legitimate  these 
conclusions  in a variety  of ways.  In particular,  leaps  to loosely 
relate  the model  results  to the "real world"  (Casual Empirics  and 
Modesty)  and empirical  argument  (No Frills  -  Empirics  and Empirics 23 24 
Only)  are more  common  in the AER  than in the JIE.17  These  results  are 
also  counter  to what  might  have been  expected.  We might  have  expected 
the AER  to have  a higher  percentage  of articles  with  policy  relevance, 
since  it is the AEA  official  journal  and thus  to those  outside  the 
profession  most  visible  and representative  of the profession's 
relevance.  At  the same time, perhaps  the desire  on the part  of the 
editors  of  the official  journal  of the AEA  to seek  intuitively 
appealing  policy  relevance  explains  the higher  incidence  of Casual 
Exngirics  and Modesty  in the AER  compared  to the JIE.  Editors  of  the 
JIE  have  less  concern  about  the broader  public.  Moreover,  the JIE  is 
widely  recognized  as the "top journal"  in neoclassical  international 
17  The  sample of JPE articles  is too small  to draw  conclusions  of 
this nature,  although  it shows a pattern more similar to the AER than the 
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economics.  It is obviously  more  narrowly  focused  than  the m,  and 
the prevelence  of No Frills  - Theory  in this context  can be viewed  as 
a reflection  of the pure-theory  orientation  of the journal.  The use 
of the no-frills  link  to policy  reflects  both  the unwillingness  to go 
beyond  statements  directly  emanating  from,the  model  and  the lack of 
interest  in legitimation  of the policy  conclusions  to an audience 
broader  than a group  of neoclassical  trade theorists. 
5.  Rigid,  Flexible  and Unstable  Rhetoric 
One of  the premises  of this project  is that the legitimation  of 
policy  conclusions  must  employ  rhetorical  conventions.  While  the No 
Frills  -  Theory  and Casual  Empirics  strategies  dominate  the rhetoric 
of policy  legitimation  in international  trade research  in the four 
journals  surveyed,  the survey  results  show that there are a wide 
variety  of mechanisms  used by international  trade economists  in their 
efforts  to legitimate  their policy  conclusions.  Moreover,  the Casual 
Empirics  and Modesty  approaches  each  take a number  of different  forms, 
and are characterized  by a looseness  of logic and  institutional 
description.  The  looseness  of much  of the rhetoric  of policy 
relevance  stands  in stark contrast  to the rigor  of the theoretical 
discourse.  I8  I argue  below  that  this looseness  also compensates  for 
the lack of persuasiveness  of theoretical  and econometric  discourse. 
Rhetorical  devices  are the ways by which  economists  argue  a 
theory's  relevance  -- that is, establish  the legitimacy  of  their 
la The diversity  and looseness  of the rhetoric  of policy  relevance 
found  in  our  survey  is  further  evidence  of  the  oft-noted  divergence 
between  the  methodology  economists  preach  and  the  one  they  practice 
(Blaug, 1980, Caldwell,  1982 and Beed, 1991).  International  economists 
continue  to insist that they do and should continue  to practice  science 
along  logical  positivist  lines, as evidenced  by Rassekh  and Thompson's 
(1993)  recent  call  for  more  empirical  testing  of  the  factor  price 
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policy  conclusions.  The point  is not  that one rhetorical  approach  is 
more  scientific  than another,  but  that the accepted  rhetorical 
conventions  for  linking  theory  to policy  conclusions  are not  of the 
same  tenor as the accepted  conventions  of theoretical  or empirical 
discourse.  As a result,  in a field where ,writing structure  and even 
methodology  are otherwise  extremely  uniform,  the rhetoric  of policy 
relevance  is diverse,  flexible  and unrigorous.  Paradigmatic 
convention  seems not  to dictate  this aspect  of the discourse.  Norms 
of systematic  and  logical  analysis  break  down precisely  where  the most 
is at stake  in economic  analysis  -- the legitimacy  of its policy 
conclusions. 
There  are a number  of possible  explanations  for this absence  of 
narrowly-defined  rules  for establishment  of policy  relevance.  Each  of 
the many  views  we  find  is based  on a different  conception  of the 
function  of policy  conclusions  in the economics  text.  One view  is 
that  the policy  conclusions  simply  do not matter  -- in other  words, 
that  the method  of legitimating  policy  conclusions  can vary  widely 
precisely  because  it matters  so little.  This  is one version  of the 
sandwich  theory:  Scientific  method  applies  only  to the model 
construction  and comparative  static analysis  that constitute  the 
8'meat1'  of the article.  Policy  conclusions  are  the bread,  placed  in 
the conclusion  where  the effects  can be  ignored.  To  invoke  another 
food metaphor,  policy  conclusions  are simply  frosting  on a theoretical 
cake  --  decorative,  not  substantive.  This view  is supported  by  Solow 
(19911, who  admits  that,  "Serious  economics  needs  a bridge  to the 
world  of policy  discussion  because  the people  who  do the research 
either  cannot  or will  not build  the bridge  themselves." 
But  the case  for  "innocuous  policy  relevanceI' --  an analogue  to 27 
Blaug's  (1980, p.  128)  "innocuous  falsificationism"  -- is hard  to make 
in a field which  often  defines  its raison  d'etre  as analysis  of the 
welfare  effects  of alternative  policies  in international  trade.  Over 
60% of the articles  surveyed  contain  such conclusions,  and  economists 
often  complain  about  the unwillingness  of,policy  makers  to listen  to 
their prescriptions.'g 
A second  interpretation  is that the lack of uniformity  in the 
criteria  for establishment  of policy  legitimacy  reflects  a deep-seated 
lack of agreement  on the relation  between  analysis  and policy 
prescription.  Samuels  (1980) conducted  a survey  of his colleagues  at 
Michigan  State University  in 1977, asking:  "What do you  think  is the 
relationship  between  the pro-free  trade position  and the status  of 
economics  as a science?t'  He concluded  that: 
there was  considerable  diversity,  especially  regarding  arguing 
with  respect  to policy  on a i'scientific'l  basis  .  .  . There  are 
enormous  differences  as to whether  economics  can properly  address 
the policy  issue at all; what  economics  can say on the issue, 
assuming  it can  speak  to it; what  considerations  are relevant; 
and  inter  alia,  the substance  of any value  premises  involved.  (p. 
179) 
Samuels  notes  that such diversity  is similar  to that found  in a review 
of literature  on the same question  from  the 1870-1914  era.  This 
explanation  is plausible  for the profession  as a whole,  but  the views 
of Samuels'  colleagues 
19  For  example, 
at Michigan  State University  are  likely  more 
in  his  survey  of  "The  Normative  Theory  of 
International  Trade",  Max  Corden  (1984) states: 
The usefulness  of normative  trade theory depends  on the readiness 
with which governments  take the advice of economists who are trained 
in, and apply this body of theory.  The difficulty  is that often the 
arguments  of economists  have  "fallen  on stony ground". 28 
diverse  than those  of economists  publishing  in the four journals  we 
surveyed,  since  the latter  includes  almost  exclusively  the work  of 
neoclassical  economists. 
A third view  is that policy  conclusions  matter  so much  they 
cannot  be  left merely  to the logic of optimization  theory.  The 
looseness  of  the policy-legitimation  rhetoric  exists because  policy 
conclusions  are  too important  to be left to the mercy  of a  highly 
abstract,  often  specialized  game-theoretic  logic which  lacks 
institutional  grounding,  has  little  intuitive  appeal  and unproven 
robustness.  From  this point  of view,  the recourse  to different 
metaphors  of argument,  as evidenced  by  the high  incidence  of Casual 
Empirics  and Modesty,  is an indication  that  the rhetoric  of micro- 
based  general  equilibrium  analysis  and  the Pareto  efficiency  criterion 
is insufficient  to  persuade  readers  of the practicality  of  the policy 
prescriptions  based  on them.  The low incidence  of No Frills  - 
Empirics  shows  that  this  is also true of econometrics  argumentation. 
Weintraub  (1991) has referred  to this as evidence  of the  "instability" 
of such discourse.  The  instability  of general  equilibrium  analysis 
has been  located  in its axiomatic  roots,  its "Procrustean  tendencies" 
(Coddington,  1979) and most  recently  in its careful  construction  in 
the history  of economic  thought  (Weintraub,  1991).  The  tenuous 
stability  of econometrics  discourse  can be attributed  to the 
acknowledged  vagueness  of most  translations  of theory  into  empirical 
test  (Learner,  19911,  an awareness  of the pervasiveness  of data mining 
(Learner,  1983, Caudill,  19871,  the difficulty  of replication  (Dewald, 
et al.,  1986) and  the relatively  wide variation  in the estimated  value 
of many  "historical  constants"  (Mirowski,  1992). 29 
6.  (Policy) Conclusions:  Economic  Knowledge  and Economic  Policy 
Rhetoric  in economics  is neither  bad,  nor  avoidable.  It must  be 
borne  in mind  that  theoretical  modelling  and econometric  estimation 
are rhetoric  too.  Observing  these forms  of rhetoric  in the 
establishment  of policy  conclusions  increases  our understanding  of the 
construction  of economic  knowledge  itself.  This  awareness,  I hope, 
will  not  simply  lead  to a reconsideration  of existing  modes  for 
establishing  relevance.  What  is needed  is a rethinking  of why  these 
modes  are necessary  to make  economics  writing  "work"  -- that  is, 
effectively  convey  policy  prescriptions.  Rhetorical  analysis  of 
policy  relevance  in international  trade research  shows a looseness  of 
argument  forbidden  within  the theoretical  or empirical  portion  of  the 
text.  I have  argued  that this reveals  that  the policy  conclusions  are 
too important  to be  left  to these more  rigid  and unstable  rhetorical 
conventions.  Without  this adaptability  in policy-relevant  rhetoric, 
policy  conclusions  would  be  less persuasive.  To the degree  that  the 
social  function  of the economics  article  is to prescribe  policy, 
reliance  on a methodology  based  on individualist  Pareto  optimality  or 
econometric  evidence  is apparently  insufficiently  persuasive,  even  for 
economists. 
Those  dissatisfied  with  the prominence  of this adaptability  in 
the rhetoric  of economic  l'sciencelN  must  ask what  function  its 
mechanisms  have.  If Boland  (1989) is correct  that the Popper- 
Samuelson  criterion  of testability  is all  that distinguishes  the 
scientific  economic  model  from a non-scientific  one,  then  the crisis 
of policy  legitimation  is easier  to understand.  If the generation  of 
new  knowledge  requires  neither  U'realistic"  assumptions  nor  empirical 
falsification,  then  the basis  for the legitimation  of policy 30 
conclusions  is an open matter.  Still,  there  is an overriding  sense 
among  international  economists  that new knowledge  should  be policy- 
relevant,  but  considerable  confusion  over what  constitutes  such 
knowledge.  What  is the status  of the knowledge  generated  from pure 
theory,  whose  resulting  hypotheses  are not  tested  and assumptions  not 
defended?  If "the world"  is perceived  to be  "as if" the model 
assumes,  then are its policy  conclusions  logically  to be considered 
relevant  to actual  policy  making?  If a model's  assumptions  do not 
hold  in practice,  will  not  its conclusions  be  irrelevant,  even 
misleading  --  a point  raised  in the oft-forgotten  literature  on  the 
theory  of  the second  best?  The range of rhetorical  practices  used  to 
legitimate  policy  conclusions  is not a sign of weakness,  but  of a 
search  for necessary  linkages  not available  by  NNrigorous'8  methods. 
Raising  the policy  relevance  of international  economics  may  require  a 
reformulation  of the conventional  definition  of rigor. 31 
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